One of the main conspiracy theories purported by many European populist nationalist groups is the idea of a great replacement theory. The theory argues that evil forces are trying to destroy white, Christina homelands by filling them with other groups. Some proposals to respond to great replacement theory are to encourage or force white women to have more children, limit migration to the homeland, refuse refugees and revoke the citizenship of non-whites. This theory began to gain traction in the 21^st century following the publication of “Le Grand Replacement,” by French philosopher Renaud Camus in 2011.

The great replacement theory has found its way into a number of different groups throughout Europe. For example, Generation Identity is a youth nativist and nationalist group that has adopted the theory as fact. Also, some alarming stats out of the United Kingdom indicate that many may fall into believing such a theory, as 58% believe the government is hiding the true cost of immigration from the public and 51% believe there has been a deliberate effort to make the UK more ethnically diverse over the past 20 years.

What is abundantly clear about the great replacement theory is that it is derived from nativist fears of a group of non-natives invading the European homeland. These same fears and anxieties are what Cas Mudde alluded to as being the driving force behind populist nationalist movements. It would be interesting to uncover whether or not there are any similar groups that support the idea of grand replacement theory in Europe, however this theory appears to have gained a following in the United States.

One of the most pervasive cosmopolitan ideals of the 21^st century is that the climate is changing, humans are the cause and that we can do something to prevent or reverse it before global disaster strikes. While the vast majority of us recognize the importance of taking care of the environment, it is one thing to have laws and protections to preserve the environment, but an entirely different thing to commit to an intranational organization that determines and places limits on your nation.

The populist nationalist parties appear to be fairly united in their lack of support for climate action. A recent report that analyzed 21 populist nationalist parties found that only 3 accepted that humans are creating significant climate change, while 7 simply deny such a conclusion and 11 have remained quiet on the topic. The report also found that they argue climate action policies may reduce the use of natural resources, lower living standards and disproportionately affect the poor.

Going beyond this analysis, I have to wonder why this is even a surprise? A global climate action policy contradicts everything a populist nationalist stands for. Rather than being the will of the people against a corrupt elite, by accepting a global climate change strategy they would become the very thing they oppose. Rather than pushing nationalist policy forward against the global order, they would be taking orders from the globe.

The cosmopolitan nature of climate change and climate action simply are not compatible with populist nationalism. Ironically, this once again unites these groups against the global order whether they want to be or not. And perhaps this explains why many of these political groups remain silent on the topic.

An example where it became abundantly clear that cooperation amongst populist nationalist movements has the ability to lead to frictions was during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit to commemorate the 70^th anniversary of the Alliance’s formation on 3-4 December 2019 in London, England. The summit was intended to not only celebrate the success of NATO, but also to display solidarity in light of increasing tension amongst its members. However, what transpired could not have been further from that ideal.

Tensions were already high prior to the summit, following comments from French President Emmanuel Macron’s comments about NATO being “brain dead” only a month earlier. However, this was not the only source of tension, as US President Donald Trump has been calling on NATO Allies to increase their military expenditures to a minimum of 2% of their GDP to make more of a contribution and ease reliance on the US military.

In fact, military expenditures were one of the very first issues tabled at the NATO summit during a meeting between President Trump and Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. Among other issues mentioned were divisions in policy towards Syria. As if those were not enough, President Trump called off a news conference in the wake of comments that were overheard by a hot-mic given by Prime Minister Trudeau in which he appeared to be mocking the President.

Although many of the parties involved in these issues are not part of populist nationalists’ movements themselves, these issues were exacerbated by the rise of nationalism in the international institution. It is important to recognize that NATO is the biggest and longest-lasting military alliances of its kind. It truly is an unprecedented organization. However, its ability to maintain such long-lasting cooperation was predicated upon mutual trust and cooperation. And it appears that with the rise of nationalist populist movements in Europe and elsewhere has strained this relationship.

In response to both increased migrations, as well as following the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks in France, a populist nativist movement began to arise across Europe and beyond under the title PEGIDA. PEGIA began in Germany, and the acronym roughly translates as Patriotic Europeans against Islamization of the West.

The origins of this movement were quite modest, as it only attracted 300 people in its first demonstration in Dresden, Germany in October 2014. However, following the attacks in France, it reached the heights of an estimated 25,000 demonstrators. PEGIDA published a 19-point manifesto that espouses Judeo-Christian values and calls for greater protection.

While it was founded in Germany, it soon gained traction elsewhere around the world. Similar movements under the same banner have surfaced in Norway, Denmark, Spain, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Canada and Sweden. However, none of these branches ever reached a comparable size to the demonstrations held in Dresden.

Although this movement is more of a reactionary one and does not necessarily display cooperation amongst populist nationalism internationally, it does show how their ideas spread and gain legitimacy in an international context. For instance, PEGIDA’s origins were small and modest up until the Charlie Hebdo attacks. These attacks occurred in France, yet the strongest demonstrations took place in Germany. This illustrates how populist nationalist movements pragmatically utilize events in other settings to justify their own beliefs.

PEGIDA also furthers the narrative that European populist nationalism is inherently nativist, and relies on defining the non-native more so than it does defining the native values and characteristics. Ultimately this allows the populist nationalist movements to cooperate together, because they target Muslims and Islam as a common non-native group.

A non-political example of populist nationalists functioning through internationalism is the Generation Identity (GI)youth group. It has four main pillars, consisting of metapolitics, activism, community and education. It demands for an open debate about identity, remigration, the preservation of ethnocultural identity, to defend what’s theirs, to help in place and secure the borders.

GI originated in France seven years ago, and now has chapters in a number of countries across Europe, including Italy, Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. GI stems from the Identitarian movement, and views the migration crisis as a great replacement and Islamization of Europe’s white, Christian identity. While they claim to be non-violent and non-racist, one of the members in France’s branch of GI was charged with incitement to terrorism after being recorded assaulting a 14-year-old girl.

This past summer in August 2019, three members of France’s GI branch were jailed as a result of stunt pulled in April 2018. A group of approximately 100 members of GI marched into the Alps along the Italian border to prevent migrants from crossing the border.

GI has even expanded outside the borders of the European Union, as it also has branches in Switzerland, Serbia and Canada. All of these branches appear to embrace nativism, furthering claims by Cas Mudde that this is the dominant ideology driving populist nationalism.

GI also displays how groups who supposedly seek to preserve their own identity, focus more heavily on what is non-native rather than what is native. This example effectively displays the inherent contradictions that come from creating a populist nationalist movement predicated upon internationalism. While they purport to be defending a common ideal of homogenous identity, they rely heavily upon international recognition to enhance their own legitimacy.

In a recent piece for the Guardian, Cas Mudde expanded upon the subject of populism, and included a new element to consider when examining the far-right specifically. He argued that the majority of countries can foster radical-right politics as more people think there are too many immigrants (nativism), that crime is punished too leniently (authoritarianism) and that political elites are corrupt (populist). These views are fueling the rise of populist nationalism across Europe, and in particular nativism is a major factor spurring these movements forward.

In another article for the Atlantic, Mudde spent more time developing the concept of nativism, and how it fits amongst the discussion of populist nationalism. Nativism is a xenophobic nationalism, advocating for one state for every nation and one nation for every state. Also, it perceives the non-native as being threatening, and this includes non-native ideas.

In the context of Europe, the anti-Muslim and anti-Islam rhetoric comes more into focus. Nativism is a step beyond nationalism and its superiority complex. Rather, nativism is more of an assault on ‘the other.’ In the same article, Mudde explained that nativists spend more time defining “them” (non-natives) than “us” (natives).

In fact, this may enlighten us as to why modern populist nationalist movements have been more successful utilizing internationalism since the creation of Europe of Nations and Freedom and its evolution into Identity and Democracy. These alliances are not describing who they are, but rather who they are not. Nativism enables populist nationalist alliances to be more sustainable so long as they do not have to explain who they are because they gain their legitimacy from loosely from determining the non-native and incorporating everyone else. This allows it to transcend national borders without coming into complete conflict with another nativist group since they have a common non-native.

Based on this assumption, should the migrant crisis be resolved and Europe gain more control over its borders, it is likely that many of these alliances will cease to exist. This will be as a result of nativism shifting its focus from Muslims and Islam to more immediate and perceived threats that are non-native.

One very interesting connection that cannot be overlooked when examining nationalist populist movements in Europe, is their connection across the Atlantic. One of the most ardent supporters of Europe’s nationalist populist parties is Steve Bannon, US President Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign advisor.

Leading up to the European Parliamentary elections in May 2019, Bannon was so heavily involved in supporting nationalist populist movements that he was accused of meddling in the elections. He was engaged in attempting to build alliances across the Atlantic with like minded groups to that of President Trump. Bannon has a think tank in Brussels called The Movement, which aimed to help unify Europe’s nationalist populists.

It’s unclear how much Bannon contributed to help establish Identity and Democracy (a group in the European Parliament), however its undoubtable that their formation and success in 2019 must have in line with what he had hoped for. Following the election, Identity and Democracy gained 73 seats in the European Parliament.

More recently, Bannon has been making headlines for engaging in a debates. However, in the context of Europe, the effectiveness of these debates is stipulated, as some suggest he will never fully be accepted because he simply is not European, while other suggest that national settings will always undermine and subvert any ambitions or dreams of a completely united nationalist populist movement that transcends borders and cooperates effectively.

This is because nationalist populist movements are shaped and formed by the locations they originate from. While there are some broad overarching principles that link these ideologies together, the relationships they are building now out of pragmatism such as Identity and Democracy are not sustainable if they gain more traction and power.

The Institute for Economics & Peace came out with a recent report on their Global Terrorism Index (GIT) for 2019 that revealed some alarming figures about the rise of far-right terrorism. According to the GTI, there have been increasing incidences of terrorism perpetrated by far-right groups in Western Europe, North America and Oceania, up 320% over the past five years.

This statistic is quite alarming when contrasted by the fact that there has been a significant decline in the number of deaths related to terrorist activities globally, which peaked in 2014. While comparing the number of incidents versus the number of deaths is not entirely a fair comparison, is it noteworthy to point out the opposite trajectory of these reports. Meanwhile, the rise of far-right terrorism is occurring at the same time that nationalist populist movements are gaining more traction and popularity, particularly in Europe.

Because of the link between the rise of nationalist populist movements coinciding with the rise of right-wing terrorism and extremism, this will certainly be something to pay attention to in the coming years as these parties become more established. A conceded effort will be needed to avoided extremes and political radicalization.

There are currently a number of different programs in place to combat extremism and radicalization, but specifically in the context of Europe, the European Union only has the Radicalization Awareness Network under their Migration and Home Affairs department. It is unclear to what extent they might deal with right-wing political extremism. Though this could become an important institution for the European Union if the trend continues to grow.

The spread of right-wing extremism is indicative of an international issue; however, it is unlikely that it will be dealt with at an international level. It will be important to study whether the rhetoric employed by these nationalist populist groups impacts the radicalization of political extremists, or if something else is afoot.

One symbolic action appears to have crossed the Atlantic, imported from the United States to Denmark. Denmark recently completed the installment of a fence along the German border. While the fence (standing at 1.5 meters tall) is designed to prevent the spread of swine fever to from Germany into Denmark, it also marks a visible barrier that divides one nation from another.

As it turns out, the pork industry is incredibly lucrative and important to the Danish economy, exporting a total of 1.47 billion euros to non-European Union markets. Although this appears to be only a minor issue, it is actually a quite a nationalistic policy that was supported by the People’s Party (Denmark’s nationalist populist party).

It is unclear whether the idea was born from inspiration across the Atlantic, or from countries in Europe who have already erected walls along their borders, however it does appear to defy logic. However, critics have indicated that the wall will likely have little effect given that the nearest case of was in Eastern Poland, and that it is more likely contamination will spread through the transport of pigs across the border via vehicles, rather than wild pigs roaming across the border.

What is interesting though, is that this is only a recent development in the construction of barriers across Europe. For instance, walls, fences and barriers have been erected in Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovenia, North Macedonia, Austria and France to date.

The establishment of these barriers is often linked to illegal migration, and stand as a permanent barrier between one group of people and another. Whether they truly satisfy their aim, walls, fences and barriers do succeed in perpetuating nationalist populist ideas of sovereignty and combat with European ideals of freedom of movement.

A recent survey released by the Pew Research Center examined key issues that standout to supporters of nationalist populist parties in Europe to gain a better understanding and insight into their views. They identified several areas where these voter’s standout amongst the rest.

One of their findings indicated that supporters of nationalist populist parties have a less favorable attitude towards the European Union. These supporters are also critical of migrants from Muslim-majority countries, and tend to be less favorable towards Muslims in their country of origin. They also tend to have more confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin. However, there is less consensus amongst nationalist populist supporters in regards to an optimistic future about their country’s culture.

These findings are certainly interesting, and help to paint a more comprehensive picture of underlying issues that unite nationalist populist supporters and their parties together in an international context. Given that at the European level, the Identity and Democracy group advocates for sovereignty, identity and culture, as well as their history of islamophobia, there was no real surprise that their supporters are less favorable to migration from Muslim majority countries.

What is curious though, is the unclear consensus about an optimistic future for the future of their country’s culture in the results above. Something worth noting, is that there is a clear divide between the Visegrad Four and Western Europe. The most support for such a future comes from the Visegrad Four, while the least amount of support comes from Western Europe’s nationalist populist parties. Perhaps this is because Western Europe has taken on a larger population of asylum seekers, or perhaps it is because nationalist populist movements in the Visegrad Four have a longer history of success. Nonetheless, this distinction is worth further exploration.